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The term ‘covert research’ refers to research on human 
subjects for which informed consent is not, and, 
allegedly, cannot, be solicited – not because of wilful 
negligence or the deliberate transgression of research 
ethics guidelines on the part of the researcher(s), but because the 
revelation of the nature of the research to the involved research 
participants would necessarily invalidate the research results. 
Herrera[1] provides the following example of such research: ‘… a 
researcher might feign alcoholism and join a recovery group, using the 
meeting time to record the interaction of the members. Her carefully 
tailored behaviour would include the fostering of false beliefs in her 
cohorts.’ To reveal to the research subjects what she is actually busy 
with, would necessarily result in their adjusting their behaviour and 
thus undermining the credibility of the information that she hopes to 
recover. Herrera writes: ‘This is research that exploits naïve trust, and 
where data collection relies on a “cover story”. Far from being open in 
any meaningful sense, studies like this are predicated on the omission 
of informed consent … Arguments defending covert research usually 
follow vaguely utilitarian lines. The idea is that whatever risks covert 
methods might involve are offset, or balanced, by the benefits that 
follow from the research. The promise is one of net gain.’[1]
The ethics of covert research is an important issue, mainly for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is often claimed that this kind of research is essential 
for the business of many sciences, such as ethnography. Secondly, 
in spite of this alleged importance, covert research is a kind of 
research that seemingly violates the values of respect for autonomy 
and the protection of research subjects – values that have, since the 
first formulations of the Nuremberg Code, the Belmont Declaration 
and the series of Helsinki accords, become almost axiomatic in our 
understanding of the basic tenets of responsible and ethical research 
on human subjects. 
It is sometimes claimed that the acquisition of informed consent 
from all research subjects is the best guarantee for the protection of 
the legitimate interests of those subjects. That is often the case, but 
not always or necessarily the case. It is, for example, quite conceivable 
that a research subject might unknowingly or unwittingly participate 
in a drug trial that might yield a therapy from which that person might 
as a consequence – immediately or later in life – benefit directly. 
Furthermore, there exists a danger that researchers might be under 
the impression that the fact that a research subject has provided 
informed consent exempts the researchers from any further moral 
responsibility towards the subject in the course of the research 
process. The latter is also ethically untenable. The researcher’s basic 
moral duties of beneficence and non-maleficence towards research 
subjects continue in the course of the research process, irrespective 
of whether consent has been solicited or not. 
I make these preliminary points to emphasise that, although 
subject autonomy is a pivotal value in morally legitimate research 
generally, we would do well to avoid the often mistaken assumption 
that informed consent is an absolute or final criterion for ethical 
research procedures. There is, in other words, more to morally legi-
timate research than informed consent. This claim, in turn, raises the 
more pertinent question as to whether there might then not also be 
a kind of ethical research on human subjects that could (and should) 
proceed without informed consent.
The first distinction to be made in this regard is that between covert 
research and deceptive research. What is common to both of these is 
the claim that the research cannot methodologically proceed or yield 
valu able results if the subjects of research are aware of the fact that they 
are being researched. The reason for this is that the knowledge of being 
researched will almost inevitably lead to a change of behaviour among 
the subjects that would defeat the enterprise. This phenomenon is 
related to what is sometimes called the ‘Hawthorne effect’,[2] which 
refers to the fact that ‘the behaviour of subjects can be changed by the 
mere presence of the researcher’.[3] Giddens ascribes this phenomenon 
to what he calls the ‘double hermeneutic’ of social science research 
as a symptom of the ‘reflexivity of Modernity’, i.e. the phenomenon 
that social reality is easily transformed by the fact/process of making 
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it a subject of research, since social actors respond and change their 
behaviour and therefore the fabric of social reality itself as a result of 
being studied or conceptualised.[4] Therefore, for example, Winlow et 
al.[5] report on a study of the behaviour of doormen where valuable 
results could only be attained by the researcher(s) themselves going 
undercover and becoming doormen.
This kind of covert, in the sense of undercover, research is the 
result of the withholding of information. It must be distinguished 
from deceptive research, where not only the real identity of the 
researcher(s) is withheld from the research subjects, but also the 
nature of what is being researched. The example that I gave at the 
beginning (Herrera’s example of a researcher feigning alcoholism) 
is, in fact, an example of covert research (the real identity of the 
researcher is not revealed) which is, at the same time, also deceptive 
research (what is being researched is withheld from the research 
subjects). Research can, in other words, be both covert and deceptive. 
In deceptive research, the research subjects are deliberately deceived, 
not only about the real identity of (if not all, then at least some of ) the 
researchers, but also about what is actually being researched, in order 
to attain the required results. Stanley Milgram’s famous experiment in 
the early 1960s remains the most spectacular and notorious example 
of such research.[6]
Milgram wished to study the extent to which submission to 
authority was not only a characteristic of Germans under the spell 
of Hitler and Nazism, but a universal human trait. He therefore set 
up an experiment involving ordinary US citizens who were made 
to believe that they were participating in a study to establish how 
rapidly persons under the duress of pain are able to learn complica-
ted sequences of numbers. The ‘learners’, who were in fact Milgram’s 
co-investigators, were separated from the ‘investigators’, who in fact 
were the research subjects and were made to believe that they were 
assisting Milgram with the experiment – the ‘subjects’ on whom 
the research was done were in fact Milgram’s research assistants. 
These ‘investigators’ were instructed to inflict an electric shock of 
persistently increasing voltage on a ‘subject’ who gives a wrong 
answer. No shocks were in fact administered, although the ‘subjects’ 
feigned pain as a result of the ‘shocks’ they wanted the investigators 
to believe they were administering.
The remarkable finding was that, in spite of being under the sincere 
impression that they were inflicting severe pain, the ‘investigators’ 
continued to administer ever more severe shocks – in some instan-
ces up to the maximum allowed voltage. Although Milgram always 
claimed that his results – the insight that ordinary, seemingly 
non-violent US citizens are as capable as anyone else of inflicting 
pain and therefore of irrational obedience – could not have been 
attained in any other way, his research has been widely condemned, 
not only because of the lack of consent, but also because of the 
deliberate deception and the way in which he, according to his critics, 
abused his position of authority to instigate the deviant behaviour 
(the ‘investigators’ and ‘subjects’ were handsomely paid for their 
participation).[7]
It is fairly self-evident what the main objections to covert and 
deceptive research are. I have already pointed out the clear-cut 
deception and possible abuse of personal power in the case of the 
Milgram experiment. Covert research is sometimes very intrusive 
and clearly violates the privacy of research subjects. An example in 
point was Humphrey’s study of the behaviour of men engaging in 
homosexual acts in public restrooms.[8] Van Amstel[3] writes in this 
regard: ‘Such violation [of privacy] occurred not only as a result of 
the actual observation of the homosexual act by Humphreys in the 
covert social role of “watchqueen”, but also when he secured the 
addresses of the men involved by tracing the licence plate numbers 
of their cars, and then used this information to track them down and 
question them.’
‘Privacy’ in this context can then be defined as ‘the claim of 
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others’.[9] We will note later that privacy, as defined, cannot be a right 
that is always and everywhere inviolable. Covert research is also often 
morally condemned because it allegedly violates the interests of 
subjects, and is therefore at loggerheads with the oldest and arguably 
most pervasive and compelling of all moral principles: Primum non 
nocere: ‘first do no harm’.[10]
Available space does not allow me to deal with all the objections 
systematically or comprehensively. I will conclude by formulating 
a few guidelines to identify the circumstances under which covert 
research might, and might not, be morally in order. I’ll limit myself to 
four points:
• The first guideline is: Establish a relationship of trust and integrity 
with research participants in as far as that is possible. If confiden-
tiality is promised to the research subject, that confidentiality must 
be kept under all circumstances, and if it cannot be kept, it should 
not be promised. A research subject ought to always have the 
opportunity to withdraw from participation in a study (Declaration 
of Helsinki, article 26).[11] It is clear that one of the main problems 
with covert research is that it forfeits that seemingly inalienable 
right of the participant. In other words, when we judge the moral 
legitimacy of covert research, it seems inevitable to draw on a 
strong (individual) human rights-orientated argument that has 
priority over the utilitarian concerns in terms of which covert 
research is normally justified.
• The second guideline is: Avoid harm as far as possible, yet 
not necessarily beyond the consequences of the actions of 
a research subject. The participants in Milgram’s experiment 
might have contributed to our knowledge of human behaviour, 
but that outcome does not weigh up to the harm that was done 
to them in terms of the abuse of authority to which they were 
submitted, the deception they suffered and the distress they 
consequently experienced. On this score, utilitarian concerns 
again do not seem to trump the claim of human rights and 
human dignity. 
However, utilitarian concerns can also not be dismissed entirely. 
It cannot be consistently argued that harm could and should never 
come to research participants. In this respect it seems to me better 
to argue, as stated in the guideline, that harm should be avoided 
beyond the consequences of one’s own action. By this I mean that 
if an agent A deliberately does things that harm others, A has no 
moral case to expect research done on his/her (harmful) actions to 
be done in such a way that that research will not yield results that 
will be harmful to A in turn. Take as an example undercover research 
into the behaviour and strategies of football hooligans in Britain. If 
this research clearly exposes criminal activities and tactics on the 
part of the hooligans that in themselves generate significant harm 
to other people, does the researcher have no moral duty to expose 
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such behaviour? I tend to agree with Spicker’s conclusion that 
‘There is nothing intrinsic in the rights of the research subject that 
implies that the researcher must become complicit in the crime.’ [12]
Another example that is relevant in this respect relates to an 
incident that occurred as a result of a research project into the 
integrity of processed meat in certain butcheries and supermarkets 
in South Africa (SA) – a project done by researchers in the Depart-
ment of Animal Studies in the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences at 
Stellenbosch University. In this research, meat products (such as 
mincemeat and hamburger patties) were simply purchased over 
the counter by researchers and tested.[13,14] It was found that some 
labels on these products were misleading, and that meat from 
species such horses, donkeys and camels were mixed into the meat 
indicated on the labels. 
With reference to this incident, which was covert in the sense 
that research was done on food products without informing the 
commercial interests selling those products (although it is hard to 
see why there was any moral or legal obligation on the researchers 
to divulge such information), it can indeed be argued that if there 
is proof that the integrity of meat products offered commercially to 
the public of SA is compromised, and if such compromise is against 
the law, there is no compulsion on researchers establishing the 
integrity of such products to protect those responsible for violating 
the law.
The above argument, of course, presupposes that the law is 
legitimate and just. That is a reasonable expectation in a demo-
cratic context. Laws, however, can also sometimes be unjust. 
SA, as a country, has a notorious history of unjust laws that 
prevailed in the time before democratisation, which only arrived 
in 1994. What, then, do we do when the law is itself immoral? 
What about the hypothetical researcher spying under false 
pretences on consenting adults who have sex across the ‘colour 
bar’ in the old SA – something which, at that time, was ‘illegal’ 
– in terms of article 16 of SA’s then ‘Immorality Act’, as that law 
was oxymoronically called – but certainly not immoral? Is this 
researcher consequently ‘doing the right thing’ when he turns 
the participants in to the police? The answer must be negative. 
The argument developed above can only be valid in a democratic 
context where the law has moral legitimacy.
• The third guideline is: Respect research subjects’ human rights, 
including their right to privacy, as far as possible, but not necess-
arily when they knowingly act in public. The right to privacy and 
the obligation to avoid harm are important but not absolute moral 
demands. Not all human action is of a nature that justifies the right 
of the actor to not divulge information about it. That is because 
many of our actions occur in public and are therefore open to 
public revelation and/or scrutiny, including the scrutiny of the 
researcher. Shils[15] writes in this regard: ‘Observation which takes 
place in public or in settings in which participants conventionally 
or knowingly accept the responsibility for the public character of 
their actions and expressions ... is different from observation which 
seeks to enter the private sphere unknown to the actor ... The 
open sphere – the sphere in which the individual has committed 
himself to publicity – is a legitimate object of observation, as it is 
of interviewing.’
To return to the last example under the previous point, this 
guideline has a direct bearing on the case of research into the 
integrity of labels on meat products sold commercially to the 
public. To sell a product – any product – in a shop or butchery is a 
public act which is at all times open to public scrutiny. If the public 
is misled by such commercial transactions, researchers have both 
the right and arguably the moral duty to expose any misinforma-
tion or deception. It is ludicrous to, in such circumstances, demand 
the right to consent when investigated. Spicker[12] rightfully notes 
in this regard that: ‘consent becomes morally irrelevant, because 
the information is beyond the right of the individual to control. This 
is the main answer to the allegation that covert research denies 
research subjects the opportunity to be informed, to consent, or to 
withdraw from research. If they are in the public domain, they have 
no such rights.’
What can be conceded in terms of this argument is that the 
decision as to whether the researched or observed actions are 
indeed in the public sphere is not always that easy. Take the 
example of domestic violence: is wife battering an action that 
warrants a claim to privacy, or is it an act in the public sphere that 
cancels the man’s right to claim privacy? To me, it seems to be the 
latter, but it is conceivable that there are a number of borderline 
cases that might not be that easy to decide.
• The fourth guideline is: When in doubt – and even when not in 
much doubt – submit the proposed research to ethical review. 
It is always better to consult the accrued wisdom of colleagues 
in a research ethics committee (REC), even if the researcher is 
relatively sure that consent need not be solicited for a research 
project. Often this ethical review will not necessarily result in 
placing any impediments on the protocol, but it could also 
be very useful in order to establish risk – if not risk to the 
researcher, then risk to the institution of which he or she is 
part. In the case of the meat research project mentioned above, 
it turned out that the main risk which this research provoked 
was not any moral misconduct on the part of the researchers, 
but the possible loss of financial support for the university as 
a result of the exposure of the possible complicity of powerful 
business interests in compromising the integrity of product 
labels.[16] Such a risk might well be one that an institution such 
as Stellenbosch University might under certain circumstances 
be willing to run for the sake of scientific credibility. It would, 
however, always be better for the researchers to be cautious 
of making that decision on their own, and to rather defer the 
decision until a process of proper ethical scrutiny has occurred 
in the ranks of a legitimate REC.
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